D
URING LAST YEAR'S election, were you hoping to read-up on Barack Obama's abortion stance? Too bad, if you went to Obama ForPresident.com. It featured crossword puzzles and fantasy football rather than public-policy papers. Were you looking to volunteer for U.S. Senate candidate John Sununu? If you visited JohnSununu.com, it allowed you to sign up for a free online dating service but not to sign on to a political campaign. Did you want to help finance John McCain's bid for the presidency? During much of the 2008 campaign season, a contribution submitted through the official-looking JohnMcain.com would have supported a man in Houston, Texas, without one nickel funding McCain's run for the White House. 1 All three of these web sites were intuitively linked to prominent U.S. politicians, but none were owned by the candidates or their campaigns. These sites exemplified a broader trend. Without any legitimate affiliation, people nab rights to web sites that evoke politicians' names. They do it for profit. They do it for spite. They do it to broadcast criticisms. They do it out of egotism or to indulge their idea of fun. Most importantly, they do it often and they do it everywhere. "Political cybersquatting," as this practice is known, is occurring with increasing frequency around the world. 2 This article discusses political cybersquatting's causes and proximate harms. The next section offers necessary background information on Internet processes and governance. The following section describes the politicalcybersquatting problem by showing that (1) candidates are seriously injured by cybersquatting, (2) candidates are exceptionally exposed to cybersquatting, and (3) candidates cannot rely on existing preventive and remedial methods to consistently solve their cybersquatting problems. Finally, the article proposes a new specialized top-level domain, country-coded (.us, .ca, .uk, .eu). 18 If a domain name is not matched to an IP address, it is invisible to nearly all Internet users. 19 Because the root is the ultimate source of domain-name and IP-address information for all DNS servers, its control "provides singular power in cyberspace." 20 A domain name appears in the DNS only if it is properly registered. 21 Current DNS registration is arranged through registrars-firms that collect payment, registrant information, and "ensure . . . each domain name is unique." 22 Domain names using generic TLDs like ".com" are available on a "first-come, firstserve" basis; a registrar neither verifies registrants' ownership claims, nor checks for trademark conflicts. 23 Domain names that include limited-use TLDs like ".gov" and ".edu" and ".biz" are subject to some restrictions. 24 Registrants of ".edu" domains, for example, must be "post-secondary institutions that are institutionally accredited." 25 After a registrar verifies a domain name's availability, it contacts the appropriate registry, which acts as a depository for all domain names within a particular TLD. 26 A domain name and an IP address matched in a registry's depository that is recognized by the root will propagate throughout the Internet so users may access the machine at the IP address. 27 
B. ICANN'S origin and functions
From the beginning, a series of private entities held and maintained the Internet's root under U.S.-government contract. 28 But this arrangement was subject to increasing criticism in the late 1990s by those who believed the U.S. government should not solely control a global resource like the Internet. 29 In 1998, the Clinton Administration responded to international pressure by producing an informal policy statement widely known as "the White Paper," which suggested that a new private, non-profit entity incorporated in the United States take over day-to-day control of the DNS. The proposed corporation would be untethered to government control, at least as compared to previous root holders. 30 Soon after the White Paper's publication, a group answered the government's call and formed ICANN, a private nonprofit corporation incorporated and headquartered in California. 31 The U.S. government subsequently authorized ICANN to control the root on an experimental basis. 32 ICANN is authorized to perform only "technical coordination" tasks necessary to maintain the DNS, 33 
III. POLITICAL CYBERSQUATTING
Domain-name disputes are a built-in consequence of the DNS structure 40 because the DNS relies on uniqueness to operate. 41 The DNS pairs a unique domain name with its matching, unique IP address. Uniqueness breeds conflict over one-of-a-kind resources. Multiple parties are certain to claim rights to words that form the SLD portion of a unique domain name. 42 This inherent DNS feature alone leads to frequent clashes between potential rights-holders. 43 Political candidates have experienced domain-name controversies. Some candidates have sparred with corporations, as when the Boston-based brewer of Samuel Adams beer claimed rights to domain names held by Samuel Adams, a mayoral candidate in Portland, Oregon. 44 Other disputes have involved private individuals, as when Senators John Kerry and John Edwards sought to acquire KerryEdwards.com from Indiana native Kerry Edwards for their 2004 general-election campaign. 45 Still other political candidates' domain conflicts have been caused by "cybersquatters." 46 This section focuses on cybersquatting by describing its general occurrence and explaining the problems it poses for political candidates.
A. Cybersquatting outside of the political context
Commercial cybersquatting is the deliberate registration of a domain name with the intent to profit by either ransoming the name to the highest bidder or diverting web traffic. 47 Commercial cybersquatting grew along with the Internet. As the number of Internet users Cybersquatters may also procure domain names for non-commercial motives 55 -a practice often called "cybergriping" or "cyberfraud." 56 Many non-commercial cybersquatters register domains that contain others' trademarked or well-known names to either disseminate damaging information or deny others domain-name registration opportunities. An individual might, for example, register a domain like SearsRoebuck.com to air grievances against Sears department store. 57 Noncommercial cybersquatting differs from commercial cybersquatting in that it usually "raise[s] competing social interests . . . in the free speech area" to a greater extent. 58 Commercial and non-commercial cybersquatters may register domain names that contain common misspellings of trademarked or well-known names. 59 This widespread tactic is known as "typosquatting." 60 An attorney, for example, registered EsteLauder.com, a common misspelling of cosmetics giant Estée Lauder's web site. 61 He intended to divert web traffic from Estée Lauder's site and collect consumer complaints to use in his product-liability practice.
Domain names perform a role similar to that of trademarks and trade names. 62 They help Internet users quickly locate online products, services, and information in a setting that lacks many real-world "indications of source and authenticity." 63 an individual or a corporation. 64 Cybersquatters are motivated by opportunities to accrue benefits-economic or otherwise-by duping an Internet user into believing a domain is affiliated with a trademarked or well-known name. 65 This so-called "free riding" unfairly exploits others' efforts to build public brands and reputations. 66 Cybersquatting is also problematic because consumers "may be misled about the source of the [information,] product or service offered on the Internet." 67 This presents a "high likelihood that the consumer will be 'deceived and defrauded, or at a minimum, confused.' " 68 Even in an era when Internet users utilize powerful search engines like Google and Yahoo! to locate online content, domain names are important. 69 First, many search engines give greater priority to web sites when their domain names include the search terms. 70 Second, domain names are convenient mnemonics that allow Internet users to bypass searchresult lists and directly access information. Third, domain names facilitate user-to-user "buzz" about a web site because they are a more convenient reference than a description of general content or search steps. Because domain names retain importance, cybersquatting is a significant obstacle to the Internet functioning optimally. 71 
B. Political cybersquatting
Cybersquatters first began by gobbling-up corporations' and celebrities' domain names, but some have since entered the political arena. They actively seek and acquire "domain names that are intuitively linked to candidates and their campaigns." 72 "Political cybersquatting" appears to be widespread. Prior to the 2004 U.S. presidential election, for example, 1,604 domain names evoked the name of either President George W. Bush or Senator John Kerry. Less than 1 percent of these domains were held by the candidates' campaigns. 73 Cybersquatting has affected campaigns for nearly all political offices in the United States. Candidates for U.S. Senate, 74 U.S. House, 75 governor, 76 lieutenant governor, 77 attorney general, 78 state senate, 79 state house, 80 mayor, 81 and county commissioner 82 have all been recent cybersquatting targets. Even several domains using the name of a judicial candidate in Angelina County, Texas, were snatched by a cybersquatter. 83 94 Political cybersquatting is an "analog to traditional cybersquatting" for four principal reasons. 95 101 This is a fairly common method used by commercial and non-commercial cybersquatters. Another example is that typing in BarackObamma.com (adding an "m" to BarackObama.com, an official campaign web site, took you to a blog piece entitled "Losing Faith in Obama").
include a desire to criticize, 104 parody, 105 inconvenience, 106 or impersonate 107 a political candidate. Fourth, political cybersquatting, like cybersquatting generally, free-rides on efforts to build public reputations, fosters online deception and confusion, and prevents Internet users from reliably employing domain names to locate online information. While political cybersquatting and its commercial antecedent are alike in many respects, cybersquatting is particularly pernicious when it involves political candidates. As explained below, web sites are especially vital to modern political campaigns, political campaigns' organizational structures and operating environments leave candidates exceptionally exposed to cybersquatting, and candidates cannot rely on existing preventive and remedial measures to consistently solve cybersquatting problems.
Web Sites Are Vital to Modern Political Campaigns
Web sites are critical to today's political campaigns. Any campaign's core purpose is to inform and mobilize a large number of people within a relatively short period. Oftentimes this must be done on a "shoestring" budget. Web sites efficiently perform three vital campaign functions. First, a campaign web site is an invaluable fundraising tool. Candidates use their sites to solicit contributions directly, to sell campaign paraphernalia, to publicize fundraising events, and to recruit fundraisers. These efforts have paid off handsomely. Total online fundraising in the United States exceeded $100 million in 2006. 108 In a single day, long-shot 2008 U.S. presidential candidate Ron Paul raised $6 million from over 24,000 contributors online. 109 Other candidates have attracted record numbers of new donors largely because the Internet allows the general public to make political contributions more easily than in the past. 110 Second, a campaign web site is an effective organizational tool. Candidates use web sites to enlist volunteers, facilitate voter-to-voter communications, and encourage grassroots events. In particular, Barack Obama's ability to organize supporters through the Internet is often cited as a major reason for his successful run for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination in 2008. 111 Third, campaign web sites are a useful communication tool. The number of people who list the Internet as their primary source for political news has recently doubled and a substantial percentage seek political information from candidates' web sites. 112 Web sites thus offer candidates an important alternative to paying for expensive ads or relying on uncertain broadcast news coverage. Candidates speak directly to voters through sites that supply policy proposals, offer detailed biographies, provide press releases, disclose campaign contributors, feature candidate blogs, and furnish web videos. U.S. presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Fred Thompson signaled campaign sites' importance by announcing their respective candidacies through online videos on their web sites. 113 Even with many of today's Internet users turning to powerful search engines to locate online content, candidate web sites are most effective as campaign tools if they are affiliated with desirable domain names. 114 Domains en-SANDERSON 10 sure better search-result placement, serve as a mnemonic for voters, and facilitate voter-tovoter "buzz" about a site. Easy-to-remember domain names also guard against cybersquatters who constantly devise new tactics to manipulate search-engine results. 115 One cybersquatter, for example, nabbed KenCalvert.com and used metatags (information that search engines use to find search-related web content) related to U.S. Congressman Ken Calvert to steer search-engine users to a pornographic web page. 116 Internet users who knew Ken Calvert's true domain name did not fall victim to the cybersquatter's tactics.
Because campaigns must reach a broad public, political cybersquatting can harm a campaign by seizing a key outreach tool from a candidate's hands. 117 Cybersquatters who "appropriat[e] an official-sounding name" hinder a candidate's "ability to recruit supporters, communicate with the press, . . . disseminate [a] message to the undecided voters," and raise funds by drawing web traffic away from the candidate's site. 118 Voters, too, have an interest in knowing that the online location where they volunteer, read, and contribute is an official campaign site. Political cybersquatting's diverting effects can be significant. In 1996, for example, non-commercial cybersquatters who registered Dole96.org, Clinton96.org, Forbes96. org, and Buchanan96.org said that 20 percent of the inquiries they received were intended for the campaigns. 119 For part of the 2008 election cycle, the cybersquatted site JohnMcain. com featured a "contribution" web page identical to an official campaign "contribution" web page at JohnMcCain.com. 120 It is uncertain whether any supporters of Republican presidential candidate John McCain were defrauded out of money, but that danger was certainly present.
Political Campaigns' Organizational Structures and Operating Environments Make Candidates Vulnerable to Cybersquatting
Characteristics common to campaign organizations and political campaigns render candidates uniquely vulnerable to cybersquatting. Candidates in this respect are perhaps even more vulnerable to cybersquatting than corporations, the typical targets of conventional cybersquatting. Business corporations usually exist for long and indefinite periods, so cybersquatters cannot exploit short-term status. Most corporations also have an early advantage over cybersquatters in registering domain names because they rarely invite press coverage before they start up.
b. Political campaigns are divisive.
Political campaigns' divisive nature also exposes candidates to cybersquatting. 128 Campaigns are inherently divisive because candidates compete directly in a zero-sum game. This winner-take-all environment prompts some candidates to purchase their opponents' domain names. The campaign of former U.S. Congressman Henry Bonilla, for example, registered at least a dozen domains that included the name of Bonilla's opponent, Rick Bolanos. It posted statements on the sites that read "Coming soon-information for the benefit of voters in the 23rd Congressional District," to give an impression that Bolanos had neglected to create a campaign web site. 129 Likewise, San Francisco mayoral candidate Clint Reilly registered several domains based on his potential opponents' names. 130 The Texas Republican Party has also cybersquatted TXDemocrats. com-a close resemblance to the Texas Democratic Party's web site, TXDemocrats.org. 131 Other examples of political-opponent cybersquatting abound. 132 Campaigns also debate contentious policy issues, thereby energizing potential non-commercial cybersquatters to register candidate domain names. Cybersquatters may want to criticize, 133 porations do not always operate in a winnertake-all setting. They may not even have direct competition in their specialized market or geographic region. Moreover, for obvious commercial reasons, corporations seldom deal with issues that make them lightning rods for criticism and non-commercial cybersquatting. It is hard to imagine, for example, a state-wide business's CEO discussing abortion, immigration, or gay marriage the way a gubernatorial candidate must often do. Candidates are therefore unusually vulnerable to cybersquatting because of the intense, conflict-ridden environment in which they operate.
Existing Cybersquatting Preventive Measures and Remedies Are Ill-Suited to Help Candidates
Given candidates' unique vulnerabilities, they often confront cybersquatting threats and problems. Their choices are to seek to purchase domain names preemptively, to negotiate with cybersquatters, or to attempt to wrench domain names from them. Each choice has its advantages, but none can reliably avoid or solve political cybersquatting problems.
a. Purchasing domain names may prove impractical, expensive, and strategically foolish.
Candidates can preempt cybersquatters by purchasing domain names long before their campaigns begin. This most effectively forestalls cybersquatters when candidates register multiple variations and misspellings (i.e., JohnSmith.com, JonSmith.com, JohnSmithFor Congress.com, SmithForCongress.com, John Smith2008.com, Smith2008.com, SmithForCongress2008.com, etc.) under as many TLDs as possible (i.e., ".com," ".org," ".net," ".info," ".us," ".mobi," etc.). 136 The Republican National Committee has an effective advance-buying program. It holds "dozens of web domains for defensive purposes," including GeorgePBush. com, for the nephew of President George W. Bush and son of former Florida Governor Jeb Bush. 137 But advance purchasing has three main shortcomings. First, some candidates might not be able to purchase domains well in advance. Many politicians decide to run for office only shortly before election season begins. Presidential tickets are particularly helpless. To beat cybersquatters to the punch, presidential candidates would need to think of potential running mates years before securing their party's nomination. 138 Second, the "sheer number of permutations of a potential candidate's name . 141 Many candidates fail to realize that domain-name registrants' information is typically made available to the public. 142 After a domain name is purchased or otherwise obtained, a candidate can prevent postelection cybersquatting by holding the domain indefinitely. Short-term campaign organizations may have difficulty doing this, but candidates can ask their parties to hold a domain.
b. Negotiation gives political cybersquatters
the opportunity to extract high prices or gain access to candidates.
Negotiation is an option available to all cybersquatting targets, including candidates. Candidates can make first contact by using a cybersquatter's information found in the WHOIS-a database of domain-name registrants. 143 Nego-
POLITICAL CYBERSQUATTING 13
136 The ".mobi" TLD will likely become more crucial to campaigns in the future, as it provides a special TLD for Internet users on their handheld devices. 
c. Wresting domain names from political cybersquatters is difficult because of existing processes' shortcomings.
Candidates may use several methods to capture domain names held by cybersquatters. U.S. candidates sometimes file claims under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). 146 ACPA authorizes civil claims against any person who, with "bad faith intent to profit," registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that reflects the trademark or personal name of another. 147 Its remedies include domain-name transfer, domain-name cancellation, actual damages, treble damages, and statutory damages. 148 ACPA is not ideal for solving political-cybersquatting problems because: (1) litigation is too costly and slow for most candidates; (2) non-commercial cybersquatters may not have the requisite "bad faith intent to profit;" and (3) jurisdictional issues may prevent American courts from reaching foreign cybersquatters. 149 We turn instead to a remedial method that holds more promise for political-cybersquatting victims: ICANN's Uniform DomainName Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP). 150 ICANN intended UDRP to be "an administrative alternative dispute resolution policy [that] creates a procedure specifically designed to provide a fast and cheap means for resolving domain-name disputes." 151 It is available to complainants worldwide and promises global remedies. 152 UDRP suits candidates better than ACPA, but some features prevent it from reliably solving political-cybersquatting issues. Its distinctive procedures and substantive elements are explained below.
i. UDRP procedures are advantageous for political candidates, but . . . UDRP's speed, price, and remedies make it an attractive option for resolving political cybersquatting disputes.
As intended, UDRP provides fast resolution to cybersquatting conflicts. From complaint submission to final remedy, the process takes an average of 47 days-much faster than litigation. 153 A complainant initiates the UDRP process 154 by filing a complaint with one of three ICANN-authorized UDRP providers-World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), National Arbitration Forum (NAF), and Asian Domain Name Resolution Centre (ADNDRC). 155 ify the sought-after remedies, and describe the complaint's grounds. Within three days of receipt, the provider reviews the complaint and forwards it to the respondent. The respondent need not receive actual notice of the complaint. A proceeding commences upon the respondent's actual notice or when the complaint is sent to the respondent via post, email, and fax. A response is due within 20 days after notice is sent. If a response is not submitted, the dispute is decided only on the basis of the complaint. 156 Once either 20 days elapse or a response is submitted, the provider forms a one-or three-member dispute-resolution panel within five days. Panels decide UDRP cases without discovery and oral arguments. The complaint and the response are the only source of factual information. Within 14 days of its formation, a panel sends its written decision to the provider, which then forwards the decision to the parties, to the appropriate registrars, and to ICANN within three days. A UDRP proceeding or final panel decision does not preclude the complainant or the respondent from filing an action in court. In fact, ICANN allows losing respondents a chance to file an "appeal" in court by waiting 10 days to implement a UDRP-panel decision. 157 A proceeding's exact speed and procedure differs depending on the provider used. NAF resolves domain-name disputes slightly faster than the 47-day UDRP-wide average. 158 WIPO's processing speed is a little below par. 159 Additionally, NAF's policy toward additional submissions is noteworthy. NAF complainants and respondents may make an extra submission within five days of either the response or the complainant's additional submission by paying a $400 fee. 160 This procedure particularly suits complainants who cannot uncover enough respondent information to effectively anticipate counterarguments in their original complaints.
In addition to being fast, UDRP is cheap. Its "cost is [generally] much lower than the expected costs of resorting to court action to resolve [a] conflict." 161 A particular UDRP proceeding's exact costs depend on the provider, the number of domain names at issue, and other factors. They are likely to range from $1,000 to $7,000. UDRP offers complainants two principal remedies: cancellation and transfer. 162 A domain name is cancelled-made available to the general public for registration-in the unusual circumstance where neither the complainant nor the respondent can establish rightful ownership. 163 Domain-name ownership is more often transferred from the respondent to the complainant. 164 UDRP complainants in general have had success seizing domain names from cybersquatters. Critics suggest that UDRP is complainant-friendly because of providers' incentive to favor complainants in order to attract business. 165 This assertion has support. Two providers seen as relatively respondent-friendly, eResolutions and CPR, went out of business. 166 Decisions by the remaining providers' panels overwhelmingly favor complainants. Eighty-four percent
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of WIPO disputes, 167 86 percent of NAF decisions, 168 and 88 percent of ADNDRC judgments result in a domain-name transfer. 169 Once a panel rules in favor of a complainant, ultimate enforcement of the remedy is perfect because ICANN holds the Internet's root and respondents agree to UDRP panels' jurisdiction when they first register a domain name. 170 Procedurally, UDRP is an attractive option for political candidates with cybersquatting problems because of its speed, cost, and remedies. UDRP's 47-day procedure offers quick relief to candidates, who must often race to make web site arrangements well before Election Day. Its low-cost process appeals to all candidates, but particularly to cash-starved local-and statelevel candidates. Also, UDRP's remedies are "precisely the kinds of remedies a politician will want in a political cybersquatting case." 171 Candidates presumably care much more about acquiring a contested domain name to disseminate their message than wringing money from a cybersquatter. UDRP's speed, cost, and remedies are even more appealing because UDRP does not foreclose other remedial methods like court action and negotiation.
ii. UDRP complaint elements are difficult for candidates to consistently satisfy.
While the UDRP is procedurally advantageous to candidates, its substantive requirements-particularly the requirement that candidates hold a trademark or service markmake it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to wrest domain names from political cybersquatters. All complainants, including political candidates, must demonstrate all three of the following elements:
• One or more domain names is identical or confusingly similar to a trade or service mark in which the complainant has rights; • Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the contested domain name(s); and • Respondent registered the contested domain name(s) in bad faith. 172 Precision and prediction as to these elements' meanings are somewhat difficult because UDRP decisions often do not apply stare decisis 173 and UDRP panelists sometimes employ erratic reasoning. 174 Moreover, UDRP introduces additional volatility by allowing panelists to resolve disputes based on "any rules and principles of law [they] deem[] applicable." 175 Bearing in mind potential uncertainty, these UDRP elements and their application to political cybersquatting are analyzed below.
SANDERSON 16 aa. Identical or Confusingly Similar to a Mark in which the Complainant Has Rights
To prevail, a UDRP complainant must have rights in a trade or service mark and show the respondent's domain name is identical or confusingly similar to that mark. 176 (1). Possessing rights in a mark.
Proving rights in a trademark or service mark is often political candidates' hardest hurdle to clear in the UDRP process. 177 Although UDRP primarily protects corporate names, candidates can show rights in phrases that predominately feature a personal name. 178 Occasionally, candidates have established rights through trademark registration. 179 But registration is not necessary to prevail in a UDRP case. 180 Personal names that qualify as unregistered or common-law marks "suffice to support a domain name complaint." 181 Candidates must prove the famous or distinctive "character of the mark or name on which their claim is based." 182 Candidates must also show that their personal name has attained a "secondary meaning" 183 as an identifier of goods or services. 184 A number of complainants, including candidates, have established marks by using their personal names "to promote someone else's goods or services, or for direct commercial purposes in the marketing of [their] own goods and services." 185 The first-ever UDRP case involving a personal name found that British author Jeanette Winterson had common-law rights in her name because it was associated with book sales. 186 Celebrities like actress Julia Roberts, 187 football quarterback Dan Marino, 188 and singer Mick Jagger 189 were found to hold marks in their names under similar logic. Some candidates have also cited commercial, non-political uses of their personal names to establish marks. Former British Parliament Member Jeffrey Archer relied on his worldwide success as an author. 190 Similarly, the panelist for U.S. Senator Hillary Clinton's claim to Hillary
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Clinton.com noted her achievements as a bestselling author of four books. 191 Oregon politician Bill Sizemore emphasized use of his name in carpet sales and radio broadcasting as the basis for a mark. 192 Persons who have gained eminence and respect, but who have not profited from their reputation in commerce, may not avail themselves of the UDRP to protect their personal names against parasitic registrations. 196 While this passage seemingly precludes candidates whose names carry "no commercial value" 197 from establishing marks, post-WIPOreport cases have diverged along two separate lines of decisions.
One line of decisions has firmly held that UDRP only protects personal names that have been "commercially exploited." 198 Spanish political party Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya, for example, brought a UDRP claim on behalf of party leader Artur Mas. The party cited its extensive political activities using Mas' name, but the party's claim failed because Mas' name was "not [used] in commerce to distinguish goods or services." 199 New York State Senate candidate Virginia Fields said her election as the first African-American woman on the New York City Council and her candidacy for Mayor of New York-in all, 17 years of public service and political campaigns-entitled her to a mark in her personal name. But the UDRP panel rejected Fields' assertion because her name had never "been used or advertised as an indication of the source of any goods or
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services." 200 Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, John F. Kennedy's niece and Robert F. Kennedy's daughter, was the sitting Lieutenant Governor of Maryland and a prospective gubernatorial candidate when she was cybersquatted. Despite Townsend's obvious political fame and thorough campaign preparations, UDRP panels twice refused to recognize a mark in her personal name. 201 In sum, many panels appear unwilling to find that generic political activities establish a mark in a candidate's personal name. These decisions' dicta offer candidates some hope, however. Despite its ultimate conclusion, the Fields panel conceded that "there may be circumstances where a political figure uses his or her name in a manner that would establish trademark use." 202 The first Townsend decision specifically left open the possibility that use of a candidate's name in fundraising could show a mark. 203 And the second Townsend decision considered name uses in fundraising, Internet publicity, and campaign merchandizing before ultimately rejecting the claim for lack of standing. 204 Other decisions have preserved earlier reasoning in McLellan and Warner by holding that candidates' generic, non-commercial political activities may establish marks. A panel found that Hillary Clinton's personal name was a mark due to "use and exposure of the mark in the marketplace and . . . [in] political activities, including a successful Senate campaign." 205 It specifically mentioned that Ms. Clinton is an "internationally known political figure who has received world-wide press coverage." 206 U.S. Congressman Ken Calvert was deemed to hold a mark in his personal name by virtue of his time as a federal officeholder and his previous use of a campaign web site. 207 One decision even held explicitly that U.S. Senate candidate Douglas Forrester's campaign fundraising established a mark in his personal name. 208 These decisions align closely with a series of U.S. federal court rulings. 209 Their willingness to disregard the 2001 WIPO report presumably flows from a belief that UDRP is overly "focused on the protection of commercial trademark interests." 210 This argument reasons that political cybersquatting is just as likely as conventional cybersquatting to misdirect web traffic and "diminish the goodwill associated with" well-known names. 211 Aside from different doctrinal approaches to UDRP, other factors may explain this post-WIPO-report divergence. The table below summarizes all UDRP political-cybersquatting cases in reverse chronological order.
The UDRP provider is perhaps the most influential factor in explaining the divergence between the two lines of decisions. Of the dispute decisions that discussed mark establishment, all of NAF's post-WIPO-report decisions found
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a mark based at least partially on political use. None of WIPO's panels reached the same conclusion. This is not surprising, as WIPO decisions rely heavily on the 2001 WIPO report and thus deny marks based on non-commercial use. 212 Even if some candidates can establish a mark through political activities, Federal Election Commission (FEC) rules significantly hamper political newcomers in U.S. federal campaigns. Rigorous financial disclosure requirements are triggered when an individual receives or spends $5,000 "seek[ing] nomination for election, or election, to federal office" 215 -precisely the type of activity a political newcomer would undertake to establish a mark in her personal name. Some candidates therefore face a dilemma: either comply with burdensome reporting requirements or fail to establish a mark in their personal names for UDRP purposes.
Demonstrating rights in a mark presents a high hurdle for all political candidates. But for some, it is an impassable obstruction to bringing a successful UDRP claim. UDRP, at best, provides an uncertain and incomplete solution to political cybersquatting.
(2). Identical or confusingly similar
Once a mark is established, candidates and other complainants typically have little difficulty proving that a contested domain name is identical or confusingly similar. 216 UDRP panels ignore TLDs and other technical domainname components when considering whether a mark and a domain name are identical or confusingly similar. 217 UDRP panels have found domain names to be confusingly similar when they:
• Simply add generic or descriptive words like "direct," "online," "my," "i-," or "e-" to a mark ; 218 • Attach the word "sucks" to the end of a mark; 219 • Contain a one-or two-letter difference with a mark (a.k.a. typosquat); 220 • Employ lettering that is phonetically similar to a mark; 221 • Give an overall impression of similarity with a mark; 222 or • Involve circumstances that implicate a sufficient number of so-called Polaroid factors (used in mainstream trademark disputes). 223 Complainants may use these and other circumstances to prove that domain names are confusingly similar to marks.
bb. No Rights or Legitimate Interests in the Domain Name
After establishing that a contested domain name is identical or confusingly similar to her mark, a complainant must show the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. 224 Complainants must gather evidence about respondents and contested domain names to make this showing. Complainants often search the WHOIS database-an online listing of each domain-name registrant's name, address, and technical information. 225 However, such a search is often complicated or impossible when
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a respondent is registered anonymously. 226 Complainants may also document a web site's past uses by searching the Internet Archive's "Wayback Machine," which is a repository for past Internet content. 227 Complainants can make a prima facie showing of respondents' lack of rights or legitimate interests in domain names by making three factual showings:
• Before receiving notice of a UDRP dispute, the respondent did not use or make demonstrable preparations to use the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; 228 • The respondent has not been commonly known by the domain name; 229 and • The respondent is not making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name. 230 If a complainant makes this prima facie demonstration, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent, who prevails only by disproving any one of the complainant's assertions. 231 By failing to respond, a respondent concedes a lack of rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. 232 Political candidates are situated similarly to other complainants in their ability to both show that respondents' domain-name use lacks a connection with goods and services and demonstrate that respondents are not commonly known by disputed domain names. 233 However, establishing that respondents are not making legitimate noncommercial or fair uses of domain names is somewhat more complicated for candidates because non-commercial cybersquatting-especially in the political context-raises "competing social interests to those of the trademark holder, usually in the free speech area." 234 UDRP panels take different approaches on whether respondents' "criticism" and "fan" sites are a legitimate non-commercial or fair use. Some panels look at the web site's use and typ-
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ically conclude that "the exercise of free speech for criticism and commentary . . . demonstrates a right or legitimate interest." 235 Others read the UDRP language more literally and examine the domain name's use. These decisions usually hold that "a right to free speech and a legitimate interest in criticizing . . . is a very different thing from having a right or legitimate interest" in a domain name identical to another's mark. 236 More forcefully, one panel noted: "Respondent's [non-commercial cybersquatting] is not the equivalent of exercising the right of free speech outside Complainant's business street address but of impermissibly blocking traffic to that street address." 237 In other words, Internet-user confusion far outweighs any nominal speech expressed through the domain name itself. 238 This logic has also been applied in the political context. DougForrester.com, namesake of U.S. Senate candidate Douglas Forrester, featured "an anti-abortion and anti-Planned Parenthood website" authored by a cybersquatter. 239 other complainants are equally able to satisfy this UDRP-complaint element.
(1). Selling, renting, transferring
Complainants may prove bad faith if respondents acquire domain names primarily to sell, rent, or otherwise transfer to the complainant or to the complainant's competitor for valuable consideration exceeding out-ofpocket costs. 244 Respondents' offers to sell domains to complainants may prove primary intent to sell, rent, or otherwise transfer. 245 One important issue in offering such proof is whether a panel applies U.S. Federal Rule of Evidence 408, 246 which states that offers of "valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise [a] claim" are not admissible. 247 Applying Rule 408 prevents complainants from "bait[ing] domain name registrants . . . into 'negotiations' aimed primarily at conjuring up evidence to be used in a UDRP proceeding." 248 At least one panel refused to admit a respondent's sale offer because it was "made in the context of negotiations aimed at settling the parties' on-going domain name dispute." 249 Many have expressly rejected Rule 408's application in UDRP because it makes evidence-gathering more difficult for complainants, thereby emboldening cybersquatters. 250 Still other panels have reserved the right to apply Rule 408, but look at respondents' offers to sell on a case-by-case basis. 251 Despite these differences, panels agree that complainants may not use sale offers as evidence of bad faith after "baiting" a respondent. 252 Former Virginia Governor Mark Warner's UDRP claim, for example, ultimately failed for lack of bad faith because the respondent made an offer to sell only after Warner "requested an offer." 253 Past panels have inferred a respondent's intent to sell, rent, or otherwise transfer a domain from a variety of circumstances, including respondents':
• Linking a domain name to a "for sale" notice; 254 • Submitting "for sale" in place of WHOISdatabase contact information; 255 
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• Placing a web-traffic counter on an otherwise blank web site; 256 and • Listing a domain name with an auction service. 257 The "valuable consideration" sought by respondents need not be monetary. A panel found bad faith, for example, when a cybersquatter offered Metallica.org in return for dinner with members of the heavy-metal band Metallica. 258 This precedent may be particularly useful to combat cybersquatters who try to parlay their small domain-name investment into an opportunity to gain access to a political candidate.
(2). Pattern of cybersquatting Complainants may show a respondent's bad faith by pointing to a pattern of registering domain names "in order to prevent the owner of [a] trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name." 259 This may be simple if the respondent is an infamous and active cybersquatter. 260 A pattern may be less visible with little-known cybersquatters, but commercial services like Mark Monitor provide complainants with a method to catalogue respondents' domain-name portfolios. 261 Some panels "have not taken the 'pattern' requirement very seriously." 262 One panel, for example, found a "pattern" existed where a respondent with no cybersquatting history simultaneously registered MethodistUrology.com, MethodistUrology.net, and MethodistUrology.org. 263 (3). Disrupting competitor's business Complainants may prove a respondent's bad faith by showing that a domain name was registered "primarily for the purpose of disrupting" a competitor's business. 264 One panel held that a cybersquatter's registration of DieboldElections.com and DieboldVote.com showed bad faith because the cybersquatter was an engineer at Sequoia Voting Systems, a competitor to voting-machine manufacturer Diebold. 265 At least one panel has interpreted "competitor" to include all "who act[] in opposition to another," even outside of the commercial context. 266 This may open the door for political candidates who wish to take back a domain name from their cybersquatting opponents.
(4). Using confusion to intentionally attract users for commercial gain Complainants may establish bad faith by showing that respondents created a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark in an intentional effort to attract Internet users for commercial gain. 267 Typosquatting is usually conclusive proof. 268 Web sites that expose users
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to pay-per-click search engines, 269 pop-up ads, 270 commercial hyperlinks, 271 and purchase opportunities 272 are all sufficiently "commercial" to indicate bad faith.
IV. ICANN SHOULD CREATE ".POL" AS A NEW TLD TO MITIGATE THE HARMS OF POLITICAL CYBERSQUATTING
Political candidates are uniquely damaged by cybersquatting for several reasons. 273 First, the Internet is singularly important to modern outreach-intensive operations like election campaigns. Second, the time-sensitive and divisive nature of elections means that candidates are attractive cybersquatting targets. Third, candidates cannot rely on standard preventive and remedial measures like UDRP to avoid and solve their cybersquatting problems. Because political cybersquatting is a distinct problem, it demands a distinct solution. This section briefly reviews past reform proposals and suggests the creation of ".pol," a new special-use TLD, as a measure to mitigate harms that result from political cybersquatting. 274 
A. Past proposals
Past proposals for solving political cybersquatting problems include those that favor national legislation and those that prefer UDRP reforms.
Some reformers favor national laws based on ACPA that specifically prohibit political cybersquatting in both commercial and non-commercial instances. 275 Others point to California's "Political Cyberfraud" law as an attractive model for nationwide legislation because it broadly prohibits the denial of access to a political web site. 276 However, jurisdictional limitations prevent national laws from addressing political-cybersquatting problems that originate from outside of national borders. 277 Cybersquatters and cybersquatting targets are spread across the world. A global problem needs a global solution.
Many prefer changes to UDRP that would protect personal names, including political candidates' names. These proposals avoid national laws' jurisdictional problems, but leave other challenges for political candidates. Tamarah Belcyzk, for example, has suggested that UDRP panelists simply "develop flexible guidelines that can adequately address the diverse interests at issue when personal names are involved in domain-name disputes." 278 This ad hoc method is attractive and is already occurring to some extent, but, as we have seen, a case-bycase UDRP system cannot offer a process to which political candidates can dependably turn to solve their cybersquatting problems. It could also muddy trademark law's application to non-political UDRP claims. Jacqueline Lipton, on the other hand, would revise UDRP to formally protect political candidates' names. 279 But this too may suffer from considerable uncertainty because, unlike trademark law, there is little global consensus on personal names' protection. 280 And to the extent that this formal change causes panels to consistently favor
SANDERSON 26
candidates, it is not apparent they should favor candidates when domain conflicts arise with those who are not cybersquatters. 281 Tinkering with UDRP's substantive elements will not adequately solve the political cybersquatting problem.
B. New ".pol" TLD for political candidates and entities
ICANN recently introduced several specialuse generic TLDs, including ".aero" for the aerospace industry, ".museum" for museums, and ".pro" for professionals. 282 It should create another special-use generic TLD, ".pol," for candidates and other political entities. 283 Only current and prospective political candidates and entities would register ".pol" domains, just as ".gov" is only available to U.S. government agencies and ".edu" is only offered to educational institutions. 284 Following ICANN's existing model for special-use TLDs, a designated private international organization 285 that represents political candidates and entities would communicate with potential stakeholders to formulate ".pol" policies and registration requirements. 286 It would ensure that ".pol" sites are both used primarily for political activities and registered only by political groups with credible claims to particular domains. It would also establish and administer a ".pol"-specific process similar to UDRP for resolving disputes between competing claims in the same ".pol" domain. 287 A ".pol" TLD would not stop political cybersquatting altogether. But a TLD reserved exclusively for political candidates and entities is needed for several reasons. First, it would mitigate the most serious problems caused by political cybersquatting. Cybersquatters could not register ".pol" domains to exploit candidates' public reputations. Candidates could timely and dependably access and control at least one domain from which to reach voters. Internet users could easily locate candidate domains because ".pol" provides a reliable shortcut for finding and identifying official web sites. So even if, as was the case in 2008, imitator sites house official-looking contribution web pages on ".com" sites, informed Internet donors can visit ".pol" sites for assurances that their money will go to an intended campaign recipient.
Second, it would reduce cybersquatters' economic incentive to purchase candidates' domains under ".com," ".net," ".org," ".mobi," and other TLDs outside of ".pol." Candidates' easy access to ".pol" domains will undermine the price for which cybersquatters can ransom non-".pol" domains to candidates. Decreased web traffic to non-".pol" candidate domains will also reduce non-".pol" sites' value to commercial and non-commercial cybersquatters hoping to divert Internet users.
Third, designating a specific and separate TLD for political candidates and entities would improve the Internet's functionality and organization. Past candidate web sites hosted under ".com," ".net," and ".org" TLDs have left Internet users to guess the correct TLD and
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have required candidates to purchase domains under all possible TLDs. 288 A ".pol" TLD will eliminate Internet-user uncertainty about a web address' TLD portion and allow candidates to purchase only ".pol" domains. Moreover, political-candidate sites do not squarely fit within existing TLD categories like ".com" and ".org." 289 Educational institutions, air carriers, and museums may all register specialized TLDs. Political organizations are just as distinctive as these entities and are deserving of their own specialized TLD. Fourth, as a bonus, the ".pol" TLD would provide an amicable solution for politically related domain conflicts that are not caused by cybersquatters. Brewers of Samuel Adams beer and Samuel Adams the mayoral candidate, for example, would no longer need to fight over ".com" domains. The brewers could use SamuelAdams.com and the candidate could take SamuelAdams.pol. 290 The proposed ".pol" TLD will avoid the past reform proposals' problems described above. It is unhampered by the jurisdictional shortcomings of national legislation. Unlike formally altering UDRP to protect political names, arbitration panels could develop a coherent and consistent policy that protects political names in the limited ".pol" context, without causing confusion over trademark law's application in non-political UDRP cases or running roughshod over other interests.
Some may object to a ".pol" TLD. Cybersquatters would undoubtedly complain that ".pol" prevents them from exercising their commercial and free-speech rights. This is true to an extent, but the countervailing interests of preventing confusion, fraud, and reputation exploitation in the political context demand some reform measure that combats political cybersquatting. Blocking political cybersquatters from only one TLD is a relatively non-invasive way of solving an important problem, especially since that TLD is not currently available anyway. Cybersquatters will not lose anything but the opportunity to exploit bona fide political campaigns in an entirely new area of the Internet. A ".pol" TLD would infringe less upon whatever rights cybersquatters hold than proposed alternatives like national legislation and UDRP revisions, because it preserves all other TLDs for unrestricted free-speech use. And ".pol" would not violate cybersquatters' rights any more than other newly created TLDs, such as ".aero" and ".museum." Others may say that identifying legitimate political candidates and entities would be too difficult, particularly given the world's wide variety of governmental systems. This would undoubtedly be a difficult task, requiring the ".pol" sponsoring organization to both exercise due care in formulating and maintaining ".pol" registration criteria and consult a wide constituency of governments, NGOs, and other political actors. There is a risk of some legitimate political candidates and entities being excluded from ".pol" registration. Arbitrary exclusion is an inherent problem with "line drawing." But even if a small minority of politicians is left out, ".pol" makes domain names accessible to a vast number of candidates and entities; hence, ".pol" would be a significant step forward in combating political cybersquatting regardless of the particular eligibility criteria settled upon by the sponsoring organization and the relevant stakeholders.
A specialized ".pol" TLD is thus a workable solution to political-cybersquatting problems and other political domain-name conflicts that can avoid past proposals' shortcomings. Political leaders-particularly American officials, who have special leverage because of the United States's historically close relationship with ICANN-should pressure ICANN to create a ".pol" TLD as soon as possible.
V. CONCLUSION
Political cybersquatting is a problem for candidates worldwide as they run for offices at all levels of government. It hinders candidates' ability to perform essential campaign functions. It occurs often, precisely because candi- dates are easy targets operating in a contentious environment. But despite candidates' sustained damage and unique vulnerabilities, current measures have failed to prevent or remedy political cybersquatting. ACPA and various nationwide solutions, for example, are hampered by jurisdictional and other problems. UDRP too heavily emphasizes trademark possession to offer a reliable remedy for candidates. Rather than revised national legislation or UDRP processes, a desirable solution is a TLD reserved exclusively for political candidates and entities. Problems associated with political cybersquatting-confusion, fraud, and reputation exploitation, to name a few-can be mitigated if candidates and voters have a guaranteed space to raise funds, organize, and communicate. ICANN should immediately introduce ".pol" to mitigate political cybersquatting's harms and preserve the Internet as a useful medium for real-world democracy.
